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Abstract 
 
Constitution is usually a pair of rules (s,S) that are used in a voting situation. The rule s is 
used to vote about the existing alternatives and the other rule S is used to vote about 
changing the rule s to some other rule s’. In this note we consider the question that was 
presented in Barbera and Jackson 2004: What kind of constitutions are likely to emerge as 
prominent ones if the constitutions contain more than just two rules? In a constitution that 
contains any number of rules the n:th rule is used to decide about the n-1 rule. We define 
a notion of consistency that requires that the constitution is formed of such rules that for 
every n the rule n-1 cannot be changed when the n:th rule is used. As a result we show 
that all consistent constitutions contain similar rules from n=2 onwards. This in a way 
provides an explanation to the casual observation that the constitutions have usually only 
two rules. 
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1 Introduction
Barbera and Jackson (2004) study the problem of which rules are used to decide about rules that
are used to decide about rules and so on. The solution to this problem involves rules that have
some kind of fixed point property or choose themselves. In particular, BJ study rules that they
call self-stable. Such a rule maintains itself against other rules when the decision rule used is just
that rule. It turns out that self-stable rules may not exist or there may be a multitude of them.
For this reason they focus on self-stable constitutions where there is a rule that is used to decide
on things and then there is a higher level rule that is used to change the underlying rule.
BJ consider a society with a finite number of agents but because it is rather involved to analyze
we briefly sketch their setup next assuming that there is a continuum of agents.
In a society there exists a state of affairs a which is called the status quo. Then there exists an
alternative state of affairs b which may be chosen to be the new status quo. The decision between a
and b is made by a vote in some future date. There exists a continuum of voters in the society, and
each voter’s preference is represented by a number pi ∈ [0, 1]. This tells the probability that she
will vote for the alternative b when the election comes and the subscript also denotes the voter’s
type. There is a finite number types numbered so that p1 < p2 < ... < pn. The measure of type
i voters is αi and the measure of all agents is unity,
n∑
i=1
αi = 1. With this specification there are
exactly
B =
n∑
i=1
αipi (1)
agents that vote for b when it is staged against the status quo a.
Utilities for voter j from status quo a and from the alternative b are given by
Uj (a|j favors a) = 1,
Uj (a|j favors b) = 0 (2)
Uj (b|j favors a) = 0,
Uj (b|j favors b) = 1. (3)
Definition 1 A (voting) rule is a number s ∈ [0, 1].
The voting rule tells how many votes the alternative b has to get in order to replace the status
quo a. We now determine the agents’ induced preferences over voting rules. If s ∈ [0, B] then the
challenger b will be chosen and the agents’ expected utilities are ui (s) = pi. If s ∈ (B, 1] then the
status quo remains and the agents’ expected utilities are ui (s) = 1 − pi. An agent i with pi > 12
prefers rules s ∈ [0, B] and agent j with pj < 12 prefers rules s ∈ (B, 1] .
An interesting situation is one where the agents vote about voting rules. This situation can be
thought to arise when a particular voting rule is in a status quo position and another rule is in the
role of the challenger. Then the first rule is used to decide whether the challenger replaces it or
not. Rules that maintain themselves against challengers are in some sense stable, and motivate the
following definition where µ denotes the measure of agents
Definition 2 (Barbera and Jackson, 2004). A rule s is self-stable if for all other rules s′
µ
{
i : ui(s′) > ui(s)
}
< s.
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In many instances there is a higher level rule that is used to change the rule that governs the
choice between a and b. BJ call the pair of rules a constitution.
Definition 3 A constitution is a pair of voting rules (s, S), where s is used to decide between a
and b and S is to be used when a change of s to some other rule s′ is proposed.
Definition 4 A constitution (s, S) is self-stable if for all other rules s′
µ
{
i : ui(s′) > ui(s)
}
< S.
BJ show that unlike self-stable rules self-stable constitutions always exist. This definition of
a constitution is, however, lacking (as mentioned in the footnote 6 on page 6 of BJ) in the sense
that one can continue this process to its extreme and ask what kind of rules are used to change the
second rule in a constitution and so on.
2 The Model
To study the situation where there is a rule that is used to decide about the lower level rule we
introduce an n-constitution.
Definition 5 An n-constitution is (s0, s1, ..., sn) where s0 is used to decide between a and b, and
si+1 is used when a change of si to some other rule s′i is proposed, where i ∈ {0, 1, ..., n− 1}.
With the focus on ordered tuples of rules where the previous rule can only be changed using the
next rule, self-stability is a more complicated tool than we need. We expect a good n-constitution
(s0, s1, ..., sn) to be such that any rule si+1 should uphold rule the lower level rule si. We say that
the situation between si+1 and si is stable.
Definition 6 An n-constitution is consistent if rule si+1 upholds rule si for all i ∈ {0, 1, ..., n− 1}.
Next we determine n-constitutions that are consistent, and for this purpose we have to determine
the agents’ preferences over the higher level rules. We do not consider the cases where all the agents
have probabilities that are less (or greater) than one half leaving these as exercises to the reader.
Suppose that we have a situation where all voters with index i ∈ {1, ..., k}, have probabilities pi ≤ 12
and for all voters with index j ∈ {k + 1, ..., n} have probabilities pj > 12 .
Denote the measure of voters of types i ∈ {1, ..., k} by s and the measure of voters of types
j ∈ {k + 1, ..., n} by 1− s. In the sequel we assume that s < 1− s; the other case is handled in a
completely analogous manner, and is left to the reader.
Level 1:
Let us assume first that s0 ∈ [0, B]. In the schema below there is an agent’s utility from the
level-one rule as well as ’yes’ or ’no’ depending whether the level-zero rule is being upheld by the
level-one rule. When the level-one rule is smaller than s both the proponents of low and high
level-zero rule can change it. Consequently we do not know what the agents’ exact utilities are
but it is not absolutely certain that the level-zero rule will remain at s0. Thus, we do not regard
this situation as an acceptable one, or one where the constitutional arrangement is stable (in an
informal sense).
When the level-one rule is between s and 1− s the proponents of large level-zero rules cannot
change the level-zero rule and the proponents of small level-zero rule do not want to change it as
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it is already small. Consequently, in this case and the next one level-zero rules are upheld by the
level-1 rule.
ui (s1) =

? if s1 ≤ s
pi if s ≤ s1 ≤ 1− s
pi if 1− s < s1
no
yes
yes
Let us next assume that s0 ∈ (B, 1]. The first case is just as before for the same reason. When
the level-one rule is between s and 1 − s the proponents of small rules can change the level-zero
rule, which they will do, and the situation is not stable. Finally, when the level-one rule is larger
than 1− s neither the proponents of small or large rules can change the level-zero rule, and this is
a stable situation.
ui (s1) =

? if s1 ≤ s
pi if s ≤ s1 ≤ 1− s
1− pi if 1− s < s1
no
no
yes
Level 2:
Now there are three different cases to consider, namely all those ”paths” which are stable (i.e. with
yes).
2.1
s0 ∈ [0, B]
s1 ∈ (s, 1− s]
ui (s2) =

? if s2 ≤ s
pi if s ≤ s2 ≤ 1− s
pi if 1− s < s2
no
yes
yes
Here the level-zero rule is small, and the level-1 rule is such that those who favor large rules
cannot effect a change. If the level-2 rule is small, i.e. s2 ≤ s, both those who favor small rules
and in particular those who favor large rules can change the level-1 rule to their favor, and the
situation is not necessarily stable. However, if the level-2 rule satisfies s ≤ s2 those who favor large
level-zero rules cannot change the level-one rule and also not the level-zero rule. Thus, there are
two stable cases here.
2.2
s0 ∈ [0, B]
s1 ∈ (1− s, 1]
ui (s2) =

? if s2 ≤ s
pi if s ≤ s2 ≤ 1− s
pi if 1− s < s2
no
yes
yes
The logic here is exactly as in case 2.1
2.3
s0 ∈ (B, 1]
s1 ∈ (1− s, 1]
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ui (s2) =

? if s2 ≤ s
pi if s ≤ s2 ≤ 1− s
1− pi if 1− s < s2
no
no
yes
The level-zero rule is large, and the level-1 rule is such that neither those who favor large rules
nor those who favor small rules can change the level-zero rule. If the level-2 rule is small, i.e. s2 ≤ s
then anything can happen and the situation is not necessarily stable. If the level-2 rule is such that
s ≤ s2 ≤ 1− s then those who favor small rules can change the level-1 rule which they proceed to
do as the level-zero rule is large. Thus, the situation is not stable. Finally, if 1− s < s2 no-one can
effect a change in the level-1 rule which is such that no-one can effect a change in the level-zero
rule. Thus, the situation is trivially stable.
One can do the similar analysis to the level-3 rules and so on but it should be clear by now that
nothing interesting happens on these levels but the same rules that turned out stable on level-2
remain stable on the subsequent levels. We can then state
Proposition 1 The consistent n-constitutions, where n =∞ is possible, are of the following form:
(s0, s1, ..., sn) ∈ [0, B]× [s, 1]n or (s0, s1, ..., sn) ∈ (B, 1]× [1− s, 1]n.
We remind that we have considered only the situation where the number of those who favor
small level-zero rules is larger than those who favor large level zero rules, i.e. s < 1−s. One type of
consistent n-constitutions are such that the level-zero rule is small, and the rules of succeeding levels
require more support than there are supporters of large level-zero rules. There are also consistent
n-constitutions that uphold themselves because the rules are so large that the support of neither
those who favor small level-zero rules nor the support of those who favor large level-zero rules is
sufficient to change the rules. This way it is possible to have a consistent n-constitution where the
level-zero rule is large even though there is less support for large than small level-zero rules. Notice
also that all rules following the second level constitution rules are similar in the sense that they
belong to the same set. This, in a way, provides an explanation to the fact that we only observe
constitutions that have two layers of rules; one for making the decision and the other for changing
the rule to make decisions.
BJ study a society with a finite number of agents, and it is involved to analyze. However, it
seems like a good conjecture that the consistent n-constitutions would be roughly similar to the
case analyzed here; from the level-1 on the rules should be big to ensure stability between the
successive levels.
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